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1. Argentina in the 1990s 
 
Argentina experienced moderate growth rates during the import substitution 
industrialization strategy, an “inward looking” development strategy roughly lasting 
from the 1930s to the 1980s and characterized by the promotion of local industries 
oriented toward the domestic market. However, that growth came along with increasing 
volatility in GDP growth and growing and increasingly volatile levels of inflation. The 
source of this volatility has been attributed either to exogenous shocks or to endogenous 
causes, particularly to macroeconomic mismanagement (see Mercado 2001).  
 
At the end of the 1980s, two hyperinflationary episodes created the social and political 
conditions for an ambitious experiment in economic policy. Then, at the beginning of 
the 1990s, the Argentine government implemented massive and dramatic changes in 
terms of economic openness, privatization and deregulation of the economy.  At the 
same time, as an anti-inflationary tool, it put into place a “currency board system” or 
“convertibility system”, institutionalizing by means of law a fixed and unchangeable 
exchange rate equalizing one peso to one dollar, thus “forever” eliminating monetary 
and exchange rate policy from the policy tool box of the government. It was argued that 
such an extreme and stringent rule was necessary to provide a definite “cure” for a 
country were governments’ lack of monetary and fiscal discipline were common.  
 
As it happens when governments decide to fight very high inflation or hyperinflation 
episodes by fixing the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (even without using the 
extreme recourse of implementing a currency board system) the new fixed exchange 
rate, usually accompanied by a new domestic currency name to create a sort of 
“psychological” effect marking the beginning of a “new era”, has strong effects on 
inflationary expectations and, in a relatively short period of time, inflation rates drop 
dramatically (see Agenor and Montiel 1996, Ch. 8).  
 
Argentina was no exception to this. Moreover, the currency board system and the new 
currency name (peso instead of the previously named austral) came together with an 
 2 
“emergency law” which gave to the executive branch of government almost absolute 
power to privatize state enterprises and to deregulate all markets. Thus, people quickly 
adjusted expectations, and the inflation rate dropped.  
 
At the same time this experiment, in line with what was known as the “Washington 
consensus”, enjoyed significant capital inflows attracted in the 1990s by the “emerging 
markets”. The combination of capital inflows and a currency board system caused a 
strong monetary and credit expansion and contributed to an economic boom which 
lasted for several years. 
 
A typical characteristic of a currency board system is that what one gains in terms of 
stringent domestic monetary discipline, one loses in terms of buffering of external 
shocks. Indeed, the economy is left completely exposed to shocks stemming, for 
example, from capital inflows reversal or changes in the term of trade, thus 
experiencing dramatic changes in its level of activity. A first serious shock was 
experienced by Argentina in 1995 due to capital outflows induced by contagion of the 
Mexican crisis. After seeing its GDP drop by about five percent, Argentina quickly 
recovered in 1996, as also did Mexico. However, when international shocks became 
more serious and persistent after the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, Argentina 
entered in 1998 the longest recession in its history. 
 
Thus, by 2001 it was apparent that the currency board system had delivered one good 
thing (the end of inflation) and two bad ones (a never ending recession and, something 
that was increasingly recognized even by its early defenders, a significant currency 
overvaluation).
2
 However, almost nobody was willing to pay the high exit costs 
associated with that system, taking into account that along the ten years of its life most 
contracts (with the exception of labor contracts), bank deposits and government debt 
were dollar denominated. This situation led to a sort of impasse in which successive 
economic administrations tried to save the system by means of orthodox fiscal policies 
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 For an extensive description and analysis of the “convertibility” era see Heymann and Kosakoff (2000). 
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(increasing taxes and cutting expenditures) in last minute attempts to buy “credibility” 
to stop capital outflows, something that in fact exacerbated the recession.  
 
Thus, not surprisingly, the end of such a hard rule as the currency board system 
happened in the middle of a huge social, economic and political crisis, when a new 
administration
3
 was forced to abolish the law backing the currency board then devalue 
the currency. The graph below shows the evolution of the real exchange rate for the 
period from 1960 to 2006.  The persistent overvaluation during the nineties and the 
sharp depreciation at the end of the convertibility era can be seeing clearly.
4
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2. Some theoretical explanations 
 
Some alternative explanations have been put forward to account for the initial success 
then extreme failure of the Argentine experiment during the nineties. 
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 Actually, there was a succesion of several Presidents and Ministers of Economy within a few weeks. 
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 Notice that between 1976 and 1982 the real exchange rate displayed a similar behavior to the one shown 
during the convertibility era.  To deal with very high inflation levels, in 1976 the government adopted an 
exchange rate stabilization policy based on a crawling peg system, which allowed a sharp overvaluation 
of the currency and ended in a major currency depreciation together with a financial and economic crisis 
at the beginning of the eighties.  The convertibility experiment adopted a stricter rule, lasted longer, and 
ended in an even worse crisis.  
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Orthodox views point towards “fiscal mismanagement” as the main cause of the failure, 
emphasizing the strict fiscal behavior required by a currency board system to be 
consistent and sustainable along time. A relatively simple story (e.g. Mussa  (2002)) 
points out that, lacking recourse to monetary policy and its associated seigniorage 
revenues, governments are forced to finance their deficits with debt. Thus, excessive 
deficits may lead to increased debt and, in a worse case scenario, to insolvency. And 
they mention what they see as a relaxation of fiscal discipline at national and provincial 
levels during the second half of the nineties as the main cause leading to the crisis.   
 
A more sophisticate picture emphasizes as the main problem the role of “sudden stops” 
in capital inflows after the Asian and Russian crisis (e.g. Izquierdo, Calvo and Talvi, 
2003). The stop in capital inflows required, as the main adjustment mechanism to 
restore equilibrium, a significant depreciation in the real exchange rate. Since Argentina 
was a relatively closed economy, the required depreciation was very large. But a large 
real depreciation in the context of widespread dollarization of the economy creates 
serious financial problems. And moreover, when the country has a relatively large  
government debt denominated in dollars, it also requires a serious fiscal adjustment to 
avoid insolvency.  And this view points out that the Argentina political system was not 
willing to make this adjustment, opening doubts on the sustainability of the whole 
system and creating credibility problems that, in the end, led to the crisis.   
 
In contrast with the previous explanations, more heterodox views point out that fiscal 
problems became serious after the mid nineties, not so much as a cause but more as an 
effect of the progressive failure of the currency board system since government revenue 
fell because of the recession and government expenditure was mainly driven by debt 
interest payments  (e.g. Damill, Frenkel and Juvenal, 2003).  Heterodox views change 
the focus of attention and emphasize the role of “nominal rigidities” in the failure of the 
convertibility experiment. Indeed, the virtue of quick price stabilization by fixing the 
exchange rate usually comes at a cost. After fixing the exchange rate, inflation keeps 
going on for a while, particularly in the non-tradable sector thus inducing the 
overvaluation of the domestic currency.  To avoid this, governments tend to relax or 
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readjust the nominal exchange rate after a certain period of time when inflation is no 
longer a serious danger.  But the nature of the currency board system adopted by 
Argentina closed this door completely. Thus, the only hope for the government was to 
bet on deflation to happen more or less automatically.   
 
However,  it is well known that in modern economies nominal prices hardly ever go 
down significantly. And Argentina needed a large drop of about forty percent. This did 
not happen, in spite of the huge unemployment rates prevailing in the job market.
5
 
Another possible cause for deflation, such as significant productivity increases, did not 
operate either, or at least it did not do so at the speed and with the intensity required (see 
Coremberg (2004)). 
 
From a more general point of view, another explanation points towards problems of 
“wealth misperceptions” (Galiani, Heymann and Tomassi, 2002). They stress the point 
that the dynamics of the real exchange rate and the fiscal accounts have to be analyzed 
in the context of the expectations entertained about the future path of the economy by 
both domestic and foreign agents. The starting point is to notice that the government, 
asset holders and economic agents in general acted during the nineties as if the general 
economic situation need not cause big concerns, including the overvaluation of the 
currency and the fiscal situation.   
 
To form long-run expectations, agents had to establish if the economic expansion of the 
early nineties marked a permanent growth trend change or if it was just a reversible 
cycle. They seemed to have decided for the first case as one could infer from the 
qualitative characteristics of the Argentine economy during the nineties, where agents 
acted as if their “permanent income” had increased. In such a case, many observed 
features of the Argentine dynamics (consumption boom, increase in investment in the 
non-tradable sector, appreciation of the real exchange rate and current account deficit) 
can be rationalized as arising from expectations of future productivity increases in the 
tradable sector together with expectations of fluid access to foreign capital during a 
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 There was a very mild deflation of less than 2% a year during the last years of the convertibility regime. 
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transitional phase. However, the question posed by the Argentine experience is why the 
large changes in the values of real assets after the crisis of the currency board 
invalidated widely held beliefs and found so many people unprepared and “uninsured”. 
We will come back to this later.  
 
3.  A Surprising Macroeconomic Recovery 
 
As was pointed out earlier, at the beginning of 2002 Argentina was forced to abolish the 
law backing the currency board and to devalue the currency. The immediate effects 
couldn’t have been worse: GDP dropped by eleven percent, unemployment went up to 
more than 23 percent, the financial system was in bankruptcy and there was a 
significant degree of social unrest. This led many analysts to forecast uncontrollable 
dynamics for prices and the nominal exchange rate, a long depression and an almost 
impossible task of reconstructing a domestic financial system. Some of them even 
proposed a sort of “international intervention” on the Argentine administration to avoid 
a likely country collapse.  
 
However, the new “post convertibility” macro policy consisted of a few and relatively 
“simple” steps:6  first devaluation then dirty float of the exchange rate allowing for a 
substantial real depreciation, thus switching relative prices toward the production of 
tradable goods; government debt renegotiation pointing towards a substantial debt 
reduction; some controls on financial capital inflows to avoid pressure toward the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate; “pesification” of all dollar denominated 
contracts, thus hurting creditors (e.g. bank deposits and bonds holders) and benefiting 
debtors (e.g. firms and mortgage holders); freezing of price increases in public utilities 
(now in private hands) and imposition of export taxes on the main exports of the 
country (mainly agricultural products) as a way of increasing government revenues at 
the same time as keeping domestic prices down for products for popular consumption 
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 “Simple” in terms of policy design. Quite difficult in political terms since they implied a considerable 
degree of conflict with foreign and domestic creditors and bond holders, privatized utilities companies 
and the IMF. And quite controversial in term of the implicit “political economy”, that is in connection to 
the distribution of gains and loses among diverse economic and social actors.  
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such as bread, meat, etc.;  and fiscal surpluses of about 3 percent of GDP as a way of 
having genuine funds to accumulate foreign reserves and to repay the government debt 
selectively (mainly the obligations to international organizations). 
 
Surprisingly, in less than a year Argentina began to recover and it started the longest 
expansion period on record, with GDP growth rates of around eight percent a year, at 
the same time that inflation rates were very low. Let’s take a look at some graphs 
depicting the main features of this recovery. 
 
The graph below shows the evolution of Argentina’s per capita GDP. It clearly displays 
the economic boom of the nineties, then the long recession starting in 1998 after the 
Asian and Russian crisis, then the collapse in 2001 with the crisis of the currency board.  
The rapid and strong rebound begins in 2002, accumulating a total increase of 34%.  
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A quick and superficial look at the picture cold make one think that we are facing 
“another” boom such as the one in the nineties. However, there are some particular 
features that seem to make this episode, so far, quite different from the previous one, 
and even from most of Argentina’s historical experiences. Specifically, we mean the 
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behavior of the foreign sector and the government sector. The following graph shows 
the evolution of Argentina’s current account and fiscal surplus.  
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              Source: SSPE – Ministry of Economy 
 
 
We can see a clear display of “twin surpluses” during the last five years, something hard 
to find in Argentine economic history.  Moreover, we have to remember that these 
surpluses occurred at the same time that the country was experiencing a growth boom, a 
combination even more unusual by Argentine standards. In the meantime, as can be 
seen in the graphs below, other fundamental financial and real variables displayed a 
positive performance.
7
 
 
The Argentine debt dynamics shows an exponential growth, reaching a peak of above 
180 billion dollars in 2004 and amounting to 125% of GDP, and then down to 73% of 
GDP after the debt restructuring. 
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 More extensive graphical information on the Argentine performance can be found in MECON (2006a 
and 2006b). 
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In connection with the evolution of international reserves, we can see in the graph 
below that, after the crisis at the beginning of 2002, they display growing performance 
at the same time that payments were made to international organizations. Particularly 
noticeable is the one-time ten billion dollar payment made to the IMF in January 2006 
to cancel the debt with that international organization completely, thus ending its 
conditionality on the Argentine economic policy. 
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Last but not least, after reaching a peak of more than 23%, the unemployment rate 
began to steadily decline to be about 10% by the end of 2006.  
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Pover ty and extreme poverty rates went up to 57.5%  and 27.5% respectively at the 
peak of the crisis, to beging a steady decline. By 2005, poverty had gone down to 33.8% 
while extreme poverty reached 12.2% . 
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4.  Macro, Meso and Micro Challenges 
 
Today’s main “macro challenge” seems to be how to sustain the government’s macro 
goals of high growth, a depreciated real exchange rate
8
 and low inflation when actual 
output gets closer to potential.  The main macro tools in the hands of the government 
are fiscal policy, monetary policy and controls on capital inflows.   
 
As long as the government maintains some capital inflows controls and uses its fiscal 
surplus to buy the foreign exchange generated by the trade surplus (be that to 
accumulate reserves or to pay foreign debt) a real appreciation of the exchange rate can 
be avoided.   
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 The goal of having a relatively depreciated real exchange rate is in a way a “reaction” to the disastrous 
experience of the nineties, when persistent currency overvaluation badly hurt domestic industries with 
high employment elasticity such as textiles, shoes and metal-mechanic. A depreciated real exchange rate, 
besides promoting a better export performance, provides an implicit protection to some of those 
industries. 
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A more difficult task is to keep inflation low while maintaining high GDP growth when 
actual output seems to be close to potential after several years of very high economic 
expansion.  From the “cost side”, from 2005 onwards the price level has been pushed up 
by relative price changes expressing the transition from the price set corresponding to 
the currency board era (biased toward non-tradable production) to the new relative price 
set;  by wage increases; and by increases in prices of imported inputs.  From the demand 
side, the trade surplus and increasing levels of consumption and investment generate a 
strong aggregate demand that faces bottlenecks in factor markets and inputs supply 
putting short-run upward pressure on prices also. So far, monetary policy has been 
prudent, trying to cope with conflicting demands. On the one side, in trying to help to 
maintain a depreciated real exchange rate, it sometimes has to intervene strongly in the 
foreign exchange market to buy the excess supply of foreign currency.  On the other 
side, to avoid an excessive expansion in the money supply, it tends to use some 
measures of sterilization. During 2006, when inflation expectations seemed to be 
building up, the government implemented price agreements with a number of sectors 
and firms. Surprisingly, they seemed to work relatively well and kept inflation below 
10% for the whole year, but it is obviously a short-run policy that points towards 
inflation expectations as “transmission” or “amplification” mechanisms.    
 
While in aggregate terms the recent performance of the Argentine economy has been 
very good, questions arise at the “mesoeconomic level”.  There is not yet a clear and 
consensual vision of a path to follow in terms of international insertion and domestic 
production structure.
9
  The Argentine productive system relies mainly on the production 
of commodities and products of medium level of complexity, and on production 
processes with a relatively low technological content. Given its factor supply, mainly in 
terms of a qualified labor force, Argentina could aspire to begin to bias its production 
structure toward activities combining a high degree of innovation/learning and 
complementarities (that is, strong backward and forward linkages and positive 
externalities).  
                                                 
9
 For some works oriented in that direction, see CEPAL-BID-Ministerio de Economia (2003) and CEPES 
(2004). 
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A schematic characterization shown below in terms of those two main dimensions 
depicts Argentina’s current situation (Porta (2005)). 10  The vertical axis shows, from 
bottom to top, an increasing level of innovation and learning, while the horizontal axis 
shows an increasing level of complementarities.  
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               Source: Porta (2005) 
 
The agricultural commodities sector, mainly comprised by the “Pampas” agricultural 
sector (and to a lesser degree the production of olives, lemons and honey) and their 
derived agro industries shows an important introduction of innovations but a low level 
of complementarities.  The industrial commodities sector (steel, aluminum, paper, cars, 
and “differentiated products”) contains mostly “modernity islands” with weak systemic 
effects.  Multinational corporations, with a heavy presence in this sector, face low exit 
costs and lack internalization of strategic functions, suppliers’ development and 
specialized branches. The sector of privatized utilities is low in innovations (with the 
exception of the telecommunications industry) and also in complementarities. Finally, 
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 The graph presents aggregate sectors in a very schematic way. Therefore, there are some sub-sectors or 
firms that display characteristics that do not fit the sectoral classifications completely.   
 14 
private services and the rest of the manufacturing industry developed a “defensive 
adjustment” during the nineties characterized by a high degree of informal activities, 
predatory competition, subsistence strategies and low average productivity. However, 
these sectors generate a considerable part of total employment. 
 
The graph clearly shows the “missing or empty quadrant” in Argentina’s economic 
structure, that is the space toward industrial policy should try to “bias” this structure.  In 
this regard, it is not the lack of instruments (there are dozens of instruments and 
promotion programs providing tax breaks, subsidies, subsidized credit and technical 
assistance) but their lack of strategic orientation, their superpositions, and the lack of 
monitoring and evaluation (Baruj and Porta (2005)) that are the main shortcomings and 
thus challenges for Argentina’s industrial policy. Also, an approach to instrument 
design characterized by the direct “dump” of resources on the beneficiaries, instead of 
one of designing incentives and mechanisms to allow a better use of agents´ resources 
by changing their environment of constraints, is a heavy load in the country’s industrial 
policy practice. 
 
An important interplay between the macro and meso levels, typical of the Argentine 
economy, has to do with the fact that the main exports of the country originate in the 
agricultural sector which, at the same time, produces the main foodstuffs for the 
Argentine labor force. Thus, a real depreciation of the exchange rate or a substantial 
increase in export prices tends to deteriorate the real wage and puts a substantial upward 
pressure on the domestic price level and on nominal wages.  This particular relationship 
has been at the core of the stop-and-go cycles experienced by the Argentina economy 
for decades during the import substitution industrialization strategy (see Mercado 2001) 
and even today seems to be a problem.  Some authors (e.g. Gerchunoff (2006)) see this 
historical problem of the Argentine economic structure and macro dynamics as going 
away as Argentina has shown changes in its export composition and labor market over 
the last two decades. However, this “dual” (macro-meso) policymaking challenge still 
seems to be relevant, at least in part, as shown by the widespread system of export taxes 
instituted by the government in order to keep domestic prices and wages under control, 
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and it calls for changes in export composition as well as in the consumption pattern. 
This also points toward the fact that, in terms of factor endowments, Argentina is 
relatively abundant in natural resources thus its production structure, left to itself, tends 
to gravitate toward specialization upon its static comparative advantages in those 
resources.  Therefore, the challenge of moving the production structure to the “missing 
quadrant” has to take into account this “gravitational force” then imagine an appropriate 
transition path (Navajas (2006)). 
 
Finally, and somewhat in connection with the necessary changes in the approach to 
industrial policy instruments design mentioned earlier,  at the “micro level”  the main 
challenges have to do with the improvement of the general conditions for 
competitiveness of the country. While competitiveness indexes are controversial (e.g. 
the ones developed by the World Economic Forum and by the IMD), Argentina has not 
ranked well in a number of dimensions. Significant improvements should be made in 
terms of human capital accumulation (quality of the educational system); financial, 
technological and physical infrastructure; and institutional framework (workings of the 
legal system; quality, transparency and celerity of public administration; efficiency and 
equity of the tax system and government spending; and application of competition 
defense laws and regulatory frameworks of public utilities). 
 
 
5. Uncertainty and Policymaking 
 
In spite of the impressive macroeconomic recovery of the Argentine economy, there are 
still a number of challenges at the macro, meso and microeconomic levels.  Certainly, 
they are not minor challenges for policymaking.  A serious approach to them should 
take into account that the government, in order to act effectively,  has to gain knowledge 
of the economy on which it will operate, while economic agents have to form 
expectations on the likely course of the economy and on  government policies.  
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We mentioned earlier the point made by Galiani, Heymann and Tomassi (2002) in 
terms of the problem of expectations formation and wealth misperceptions, particularly 
in what they call “economies in transition” such as the Argentine economy.  Their point 
is not why wealth perceptions can change, since they can and should change due to 
shocks of different nature thus bringing about changes, sometimes very significant, in 
the economic dynamics. Their issue is more general and has to with wealth 
misperceptions, arising in an economy prone to relatively frequent structural changes. In 
this type of economy, agents have a serious problem to detect and project growth trends 
thus to make the correct long-run decisions, since they face what is known as “model 
uncertainty”.  The graph below, showing the high variability of the GDP growth rate of 
the Argentine economy from 1901 to 2006 and the Hodrick-Prescott trend, gives us a 
rough idea of this problem.  
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            Source:  SSPE – Ministry of Economy 
 
 
 
Of course, not only private agents but also policymakers face that kind of problem in an 
economy such as the Argentine economy.  Frequent structural changes, large and 
volatile shocks, and lack of sufficient and reliable statistical information make crucial 
behavioral functions, their systemic relationships, and their corresponding parameters 
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very difficult to model and to estimate (e.g. the shape and parameter values of 
Argentina’s money demand function are difficult to figure out, as it is the level of 
potential GDP). 
 
Model uncertainty (Blinder (1998)) and even parameter uncertainty (Mercado and  
Kendrick (2006)) pose very difficult problems for policymaking. In general, their 
existence should induce policymakers to abandon the illusion of having a rigid set of 
policy recommendations to stick to no matter what, to adopt a more humble (perhaps  
cautious) attitude, and to pay particular attention to learning and buffering devices, 
stochastic elements (Kendrick (2005))  and robustness (Hansen and Sargent (2003))  
when designing policy and institutions.
11
 
 
Since the beginning of the nineties, Argentina has been an economy full of surprises. It 
displayed a remarkable boom after the adoption of an extremely orthodox and rigid 
policy to later end in a deep crisis, and it now displays a surprising high growth after the 
adoption of more heterodox measures. But surprises are, in a way, a strong indication of 
our degree of ignorance. Thus, it would be a mistake to believe that we know the “true” 
model thus stick to the current path in an uncritical manner. It would be better to not to 
disregard the macro, meso and micro challenges still ahead. And, moreover, to 
recognize the high degree of uncertainty stemming not only from the international 
context, but also the one embedded in the Argentine economic structure dynamics and 
the difficulties to gain accurate knowledge of its likely and feasible growth trends, then 
make the effort of thinking and designing policy and institutions taking this facts 
seriously into account. 
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 The issue of policymaking under uncertainty and the associated issue of learning mechanisms has been 
a matter of concern in Macroeconomics for a long time. Interestingly, the so called “new industrial 
policy” emphasizes the need of viewing policymaking and policy implementation as a process of 
experimentation and learning, that is a process of identification and mitigation of key constraints to 
growth in successive periods (see for example World Bank (2007)). 
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